
Winning the Information War: 3 Principles and a Tenet

By Benjamin E. Bourcy, Captain, USAF

Editorial Abstract: The author reviews the current state of US strategic communications efforts, and how older guidance and practices hamper the ongoing campaign in Southwest Asia. He recommends changes in traditional intra-departmental relationships, plus revised statutes and attitudes, to permit effective use of modern messaging technologies.

The casual historian may see little similarity between the wars of our ancestors, and today's high tech warfare we watch on the news. What could the Mongol hordes of the 1200s have in common with the air campaign of the First Gulf War? Throughout history, military leaders and historians have noted that several themes remain constant in all warfare. Known as the principles of war, these provide commanders with a necessary framework to plan concepts of operations and courses of action.¹

In today's globally interconnected world, it has become important to not only to defeat an enemy's military force on the battlefield, but to convince his leaders and population to stop fighting. The war of words will reach the people, if not the bullets themselves. Words and ideas will shape the battle, and ultimately determine the outcome. Having learned a lesson on vague objectives in Vietnam, US military leaders made sure the objectives of Operation Desert Storm were clearly defined and easily measured. The short war was perfectly suited for America's overwhelming firepower, and there was no chance for a protracted war to wean away public support.

The current Gulf War, however, is different. The first half of the mission, to remove Saddam Hussein's illegitimate government, was accomplished quickly. This phase played to traditional American military strengths, therefore the military commanders were well prepared to execute the mission. The second half of this goal, the establishment of a functional democracy has proved far more problematic. This is not a mission that plays into American military strengths, nor can it be accomplished by the United States military alone.

Known as classical nation building, it is a mission that the United States has struggled with in the past.

In order to accomplish the mission of building a functioning democracy in Iraq, the United States government will have to reorganize its Information Operations capabilities. This will have to occur in a number of areas. First, as pointed out in the DOD *IO Roadmap*, the United States Government (USG) must "consolidate oversight and advocacy for IO" with the DOD, and "clarify lanes in the road for PSYOP, Public Affairs, and Public Diplomacy."² Currently the information effort is fragmented and disjointed, greatly limiting its effectiveness. Second, the USG message must be consistent throughout the spectrum of conflict. The message must be truthful, and despite the American public's well founded skepticism of government information campaigns, it must be the same message for domestic and foreign audiences.

The Role of Strategic Communication

Information operations span the spectrum of conflict—as important in peacetime as they are in war. In many ways the United States has become a victim of its own success in warfare. Adversaries can no longer face the US in a pitched military battle, therefore they seek alternate routes to attempt to achieve their objectives. Strategic Communication (SC) is one area where the US is vulnerable to asymmetric threats. Enemies such as Al Qaeda have a much easier task to execute in the information realm than the USG. For example, Al Qaeda insurgents in Iraq aim to spread discontent among

the population to promote violence and prevent the US from achieving its goals. The insurgency goal of dividing the Iraqi people is far easier to achieve than the cohesive, government building efforts of the United States. There is no need to coordinate information releases, stick to an information theme, or maintain integrity through truthful press releases. All that is required is starting panic by spreading rumors, destroying things, and pitting groups against one another. Then, all the insurgents have to do is sit back and let the United States try to restore order. Insurgent efforts can come from disjointed cells with little to no central planning, making them leaner and faster. Frustration over the insurgent's shortened IO "kill chain" led then Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to observe how "*Our enemies have skillfully adapted to fighting wars in today's media age, but ...our country has not adapted. For the most part, the US government still functions as a 'five and dime store' in an eBay world.*" Secretary Rumsfeld also stated US military public affairs officers must learn to anticipate news and respond faster.³ The transition from dictatorship to democracy is messy and fraught with danger from those who oppose it for their own political reasons. Opposition forces do not have to win their battles, they only have to prevent the US from winning. The cards are stacked in the insurgent's favor in several ways. Among the most important are the Arab's historical distrust of the West, and the relative ease of dividing people compared to bringing them together. Secretary Rumsfeld was correct that military public affairs officers must become quicker in getting out information, but that is not all that must



Figure 1. (National Archives)

happen. The US can never shorten its information targeting and dissemination cycle enough to get ahead of those who simply seek to spread discontent. The nature of the two goals will never allow it. Therefore, the United States must work preemptively around the globe to spread its message of freedom and democracy. The government must seek to build a reservoir of credibility with foreign nations and people, to draw upon in times of need—such as the one we face now in Iraq. When terrorists commit atrocities or attempt to stoke the flames of sectarian strife or anti-American sentiment, we will be able to draw upon this reservoir of credibility until we can retaliate with a cohesive message.

How exactly will this work? First, we must create a centralized strategic communications office. This is nothing new; several others have proposed this in the past. Historically, the United States has enjoyed the greatest success in controlling the information environment when employing a stand alone agency created for that specific task. In both World Wars I and II, the US government created information organizations to get the government's message out and rally support at home and abroad.⁴ This success came at a price, and technology has rendered many historic methods obsolete. In World War I, President Woodrow Wilson authorized the creation of the Committee of Public Information, or Creel Committee after its leader George Creel. This group used all means of communication to rally support for the war. Creel's blatant propagandizing

trained Americans to hate the German foe through films, speeches, and posters such as Figure 1. Further, Creel's committee censored information from the American people that did not support government objectives. During World War II, President Roosevelt created the Office of War Information. This office was also hugely successful in rallying wartime support through highly effective propaganda such as Figure 2. These periods were certainly the most effective information campaigns ever carried out by the United States government. They succeeded in rallying massive support on the home front, and ultimately helped win both wars.

Clearly, a USG 'propaganda' campaign of this sort would be unwise today. If government censors keep pertinent information from the people, and disseminate highly inflammatory information, it would be impossible for the people to adequately hold the government accountable. Neither is such a campaign possible in today's Western society because of the global information environment. The preeminent rule in contemporary US psychological operations (PSYOP) is to tell the truth. This is an absolute, because of the potential harm to our nation's credibility if caught in a lie. Second, the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 prohibits United States government from conducting psychological operations against US citizens. Therefore, the USG separates information releases into those meant for foreign audiences, and those targeting domestic audiences. In the Internet age, this distinction is completely meaningless. Third, note that neither image in Figures 1 and 2 could really be called lies. The portrayal of Germany and Japan as a threat was certainly accurate. Today, we might blush at the language used to describe our enemies in these posters, but it was certainly not offensive at the time. The portrayal of the Japanese and Germans as bloodthirsty killers might be seen as an oversimplification of the truth. Not all Japanese and Germans wanted to kill Americans; their corrupt governments just led that way. Most of their citizens probably just wanted to

enjoy their lives free from interference of governments and wars. Therefore, lumping of all Germans or Japanese into one large category through this sort of propaganda effectively rallied support for the necessary war effort. Arguably, it also led to unsavory effects such as Japanese internment camps, or people kicking and stoning wiener dogs [dachshunds] due to their German origins. Such propaganda did not make distinction between the people and culture, versus the government and policies. This would have been a difficult poster theme, and a murky message.

Whose Voice?

The Internet and global telecommunications have shrunk the world so that we see events in real time. In this environment, the USG can afford to create an agency responsible for information operations and consolidation. In fact, in order to counter our adversaries advantages, we must create an office to centralize all information operations. This organization would be responsible for disseminating the President's strategic communication strategy, and all other department's strategies would fall under this office. Along with the National Security Strategy would be the binding document for all government information releases. The Office of Strategic Communication (OSC) would also serve as a centralized coordination committee for interagency efforts. It could be manned by planners from the



Figure 2. (National Archives)

different agencies of the government. All federal government players—and there are several—would take the OSC’s general themes, and develop their own products consistent with the President’s directives. The Department of State would use these themes to guide diplomatic efforts, and the Department of Defense would use them to explain pending or current military action. This would ensure USG actions abroad were followed a widely and consistently disseminated message. As a principle of warfare, such consolidation of effort and authority achieves the effect of objective and unity of command. The published objectives of both the National Security Strategy and the proposed Strategic Communication strategy would provide the box within which all government agencies would work to achieve a common objective.

The US Government has made some recent consolidation efforts, though political problems plague their inception. In 1999, the United States Information Agency (USIA) shut down after nearly 50 years of telling “America’s story” during the Cold War. Its efforts in those tense times spread American ideas and values to scores of people trapped behind the Iron Curtain. The USIA operated many successful venues such as the “Voice of America” broadcasts, cultural exchange programs, plus research and media reaction programs.⁵ These informal diplomatic efforts between the United States and other nations were tremendously important throughout the Cold War era. At a time when the Soviet Union used the Vietnam protests and honest policy debates on the US home front to paint a picture of “Amerika, the unredeemable land of barbarism and violence,” USIA efforts helped many understand the meaning of American events and actions.⁶ As important as the USIA was during the Cold War, its efforts pale in comparison to the importance of having a centralized information plan today. The openness of a wired world allows the global community to instantly see everything happening anywhere. This massive data influx can be overwhelming for anyone

trying to make sense of events, thus our need for a framework to organize and process world events. Despite this growing importance of shaping world opinion via a consolidated information campaign, the United States Information Agency ceased operations. At the closure ceremony, senior USIA official John Reinhardt stated “There is no one in this room who doesn’t approach this merger with trepidation. We fear that public diplomacy will be swallowed and destroyed by the State Department which practices formal diplomacy.” In large parts these fears have proven true, to the detriment of public diplomacy.⁷

This demise of a guided public diplomacy effort is especially damning. Public diplomacy is an effort to influence people of foreign nations—versus formal diplomacy, which is communication between two governments. Public diplomacy is vital in today’s world because foreign citizens do not rely solely on their governments to interpret the actions of other foreign governments (except when governments censor information). Also, formal diplomacy is only effective if the foreign government is a true and faithful representative of its people. In most of the world’s problematic areas, this simply isn’t the case, therefore public diplomacy becomes much more important. The Internet makes it easy for anyone to look up events and find a plethora of interpretations and meanings. Mass media is increasingly run by multinational organizations which provide some context and interpretation, though not necessarily strategically helpful to the United States. Fortunately, there is great competition to provide a framework which helps people “make sense of it all.”

Unfortunately, all of these frameworks are shaped by their creator’s intentions, and not all are reputable or concerned about US interests. Some are shaped by dictatorial regimes or multinational terrorists groups who attempt to persuade citizens that the West is the “Great Satan.” Others such as major news networks are businesses, and must satisfy a global constituency to keep ratings up and business viable.

The US Government must get into this game, to get its message out in a consolidated, organized way. It is vitally important to provide some context and justification for US actions—to compete with other possible interpretations—so people around the world can carefully weigh multiple interpretations and make informed decisions.

Other US information consolidation attempts include creation of the State Department’s International Information Program, to act as a successor to the USIA. However, this effort has been doomed by inadequate resources, personnel, and influence within DOS. Its responsibilities have been further splintered between State and other government agencies, resulting in a loss of common focus or objective.⁸

The Defense Department also made an ill-fated attempt at strategic communications with the now defunct Office of Strategic Influence (OSI). Established by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in late 2001, OSI was to provide specific targeted information campaigns in response to analysis of overseas opinion polls. The office was also to be responsible for countering enemy propaganda and misinformation against the US and Coalition. A series of articles on the office and its proposed charter hit the American press in early 2002.⁹ Amid these reports was speculation the new office would spread false news stories to foreign media, which could easily make its way back to the American people. A *New York Times* story stated that the office discussed planting false stories and sending pro-US emails with misleading addresses to foreign media. The story also quotes unnamed senior leaders as saying that the mission of the new office was too broad, possibly even illegal. Many were concerned that the use of the military public affairs arm to spread false stories would undermine the credibility of the Pentagon with the media and foreign governments.¹⁰ Responding to these concerns in the media, Secretary Rumsfeld announced in a news conference that the office had been closed. He further stated that the

stories in the media were false, and the Department of Defense never planned to plant false stories in the foreign media or distort the truth in any way. When asked what the Pentagon would do now that the office had been closed, he responded,

*"We'll have to do with the offices that existed previously. There is no question but that we have an obligation, as you remind us all, to tell the world this is not an effort against the Afghan people... We did a whole series of things characterized as strategic influence or information operations. We have done it in the past, and we will do it in the future... We had to defend against the lies that the food packages were poisoned and tell the Afghan people they were not, in fact, they were culturally appropriate. So there's lots of things we have to do, and we will do those things. We'll just do them in a different office."*¹¹

This story illustrates a few key points about our strategic communication effort. First, it is necessary and has been carried out throughout US history. Second, it can be political dynamite. The American people have a great deal of concern about government sponsored influence operations—as well they should. Any inclination that the government would actively lie to the American people, (directly or indirectly) through censorship of negative information, or planting false stories in foreign media which make their way back to US citizens, will be met with near unanimous public disapproval. The US Government and Armed Forces, as employees of the American people, therefore owe it to them to never conduct these sorts of operations.

That said, there still exists a need for the United States to centrally plan and coordinate its official strategic communications. It makes the most sense to publish this central plan at the National Security Council level, though theoretically this already happened. On 10 September 2002, the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee was created in accordance with NSPD-1. The committee is designed to foster positive opinion on US Government strategic objectives and influence foreign audiences in ways favorable to those objectives.

Further, they possessed the necessary interagency information and analytical tasking authority to anticipate future needs.¹² This committee never issued an official strategy, and was disbanded in 2003. In the same year, an Office of Global Communications was created to facilitate White House and interagency communication with foreign audiences. As of early 2007, this office has not released an official communications strategy. A 2005 Government Accounting Office report on Public Diplomacy in recommended that the Office of Global Communication fully implement the role mandated for the office in the President's executive order, including facilitating the creation of a national communications strategy.¹³ No matter the name or the location of the office, one requirement is clear and absolute: the US must create an office to centrally coordinate strategic communication. This organization must publish a plan for all official communications, including those by the DOD, Department of State, CIA, the Broadcasting Board of Directors (runs Voice of America and foreign radio broadcasts formerly under USIA), and any other federal government agencies that communicate directly with the public (domestic or foreign).

Political Considerations and the Smith-Mundt Act

This brings to light another important Strategic Communication issue: the need to consolidate both domestic and foreign "speaking" functions. As noted earlier, this is illegal under the 1948 Smith-Mundt Act, and is certainly political dynamite. One only has to look at the public outcry following stories on the Office of Strategic Influence, or efforts to plant news stories in Iraqi newspapers, to understand how uncomfortable the American public is with the whole concept of influence operations. Though these efforts only involved foreign media, the potential of a planted story reaching the American media was one of the most contentious issues. Even within the military, there is great distrust between traditional Public Affairs personnel and Information Operations planners. Many

in the PA field attempt to keep a strict wall of separation between these groups. This is a microcosm of the larger wall of separation the US attempts to maintain between information distribution intended for domestic audiences, and that intended for foreign audiences. Such a barrier served a purpose when the Smith-Mundt Act was passed, but today it is a potentially harmful illusion.

One would only have to know about the Internet to render the Smith-Mundt Act ban useless. For example, Voice of America programming is openly available on the Internet at www.voanews.com. There is a disclaimer on the website that states it is not for domestic audiences, however, anyone is free to read or listen to any article on the webpage. This caused some concern when the United States Information Agency first launched its Internet service in 1994. In response, USIA moved its servers from domestic to foreign servers and forbid its employees from giving out the Web address to US citizens. Of course, Internet search engines made that strategy useless.¹⁴ Smith-Mundt was passed in 1948, when memory of Hitler's propaganda was fresh in the American conscience. The artful way in which the Nazi regime used vicious propaganda campaigns to shape a ruthless war machine ultimately led to the deaths of roughly 42 million people worldwide.¹⁵ Understandably, American citizens became and remain highly suspicious of government information campaigns. Seeking to avoid the sort of government brainwashing that led the German people to war, Congress allowed dissemination of information about the United States and its policies abroad, but not at home.

As distasteful and immoral as the German propaganda campaign was, the real problem in Nazi Germany—the enabler that allowed Hitler to shape the sentiment of the German people in such a devastating fashion—was not propaganda, it was censorship. The absence of opposition to outrageous and inflammatory Nazi claims allowed Hitler to shape the information environment completely unchecked by any balancing force. Under Joseph Goebbels' Ministry

of Propaganda, the Nazi party systematically censored all forms of media, including movies and music. These rules were enforced by the secret police and punishable by death.¹⁶ Under this broad blanket censorship the government was free to make ridiculous and inflammatory assertions about anything they pleased.

Fortunately, a convergence of several factors have combined in such a way that censorship on the scale of the Nazi program would be impossible to carry out today. First, the free press guaranteed under the US Constitution serves as a necessary check on federal power. Any claim made by an official government spokesperson is immediately and thoroughly scrutinized by the press. No matter one's opinion on press coverage of government actions, it can be reasonably stated that the independent press serves as an effective check. Second, the growth of information technology has made the world smaller, with fewer information-isolated areas. One can rest assured that if the American military is sent to intervene anywhere in the world, the full focus of the American media corps will document the action.¹⁷

What does this mean for American foreign policy, the use of the US military, and the strategic communications effort? First and foremost, there is absolutely no danger of a government sponsored information campaign "brainwashing" American citizens. The free press and global interconnectivity will prevent such an action. Therefore, it makes sense to consolidate the functions of government information agencies into one voice, and remove the distinction of information for "foreign" or "domestic" dissemination. Technology has rendered the distinction useless anyway.¹⁸ Agencies will keep their independent press arms, but they will all work from the same central communication plan published at the National Security Council level. This consolidation will serve several important purposes: fulfilling the principle of objective; and providing a much needed government voice to compete independent media voices. The independent media in its



Official spokesman and foreign journalists talk one on one. (US Navy)

quest to maintain its credibility, serve a global constituency, and put out important stories before its competitors often ends up putting out stories that serve the strategic aim of America's enemies. The American independent media, while a noble institution, is first and foremost a business, and as such it must concern itself with turning a profit. Obviously this does not always harmonize with USG aims. Not to complain about "bias" and unfair reporting of the current war in Iraq, but the United States government cannot rely on CBS, CNN, or even Fox News to explain US foreign policy to the people or to foreigners. The government will be best served explaining its own policies. The independent media can then react and fact check those explanations for accuracy, which will serve the principle of offensive.

A pertinent example of the importance of taking the offensive in information operations is the 2006 coal mine tragedy in West Virginia. Thirteen coal miners were trapped under ground in a mine explosion. International Coal Group was left with the unenviable task of simultaneously running a rescue and a public affairs operation, as the American media brought full focus on the small town. Mine rescue operations are agonizingly slow, and in this case the sole survivor was trapped for about 42 hours. The company gave limited news updates on the progress of the rescue operation, but they failed to appreciate or head off groundswell rumors that led the miner's families to mistakenly believe the miners were alive for over 3

hours. The power of the 24 hour news media instantly spread the false information around the globe. Tuned in to the emotional appeal of families in distress and tense rescue operations, many Americans went to bed rejoicing that the miners had been rescued. They awoke the next morning to the absolutely stunning news that it was all false. The mistake here is the failure to maintain the information offensive. In the absence company progress updates, a rumor took hold and quickly gained credibility through repetition. The result was stunning and terribly damaging to the company's credibility. Viewers watched live as the families went through the emotional roller coaster. When news first broke that all the miners had been rescued, joyous celebrations erupted complete with ringing church bells and carnival style celebration. This went on for some time before the company came out and announced it had all been a mistake. The world watched live as shock and disbelief soon turned to outrage. This terrible story illustrates the importance of maintaining the initiative in any type of influence operations.

The Role of Public Affairs & the Common Military Member

The traditional principles of warfare are general guidelines for all military forces, while additional tenets provide more specific considerations. For example, Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution are primary considerations in effective warfighting. These concepts are also extremely important in the field of information operations. We must push the responsibility of spreading the US message down to the lowest level operators throughout all government agencies. Within DOD there are two important ways to accomplish further decentralization of the information effort. First, we must remove the artificial wall of separation between Public Affairs and Information Operations. Second, we must change the policy that directs all military members to refer all questions to Public Affairs, while refusing to make

any comments.

As stated earlier, there is a deep seated distrust between Public Affairs and Information Operations planners. When IO theory started becoming popular in the mid 1990s, Public Affairs immediately took a hands-off approach, to maintain their credibility and keep their hands clean. At first this was relatively easy, as the doctrine on information warfare was still being worked out. In February 1996, 20 year PA professional Karen Piper of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated *"IW has no place in PA. In our democracy, the military organization exists only by the consent of the governed. If the institution lies or misleads the people, they cannot make informed decisions regarding the issues and we cease to be a democracy."*¹⁹ This single quote sums up the traditional distrust between these two fields. Popular misunderstanding of American PSYOP—and by extension information warfare—is the core problem. Ms Piper's quote immediately equates IW with lies and misinformation. In this sense information warfare would be an ethical nightmare, and an impediment to our democracy. However, DOD information operations are closer to corporate advertising than government misinformation campaigns practiced by oppressive regimes.

DOD does not disseminate lies for several reasons. First, they are not the most effective way to accomplish objectives. Second, anything they would achieve will be short lived or too risky, because of the cost of lost credibility. Take the classic amphibious assault scenario from the First Gulf War that caused so much controversy. American news outlets were flooded with articles and stories about where a likely amphibious assault on Kuwait. When the "Left Hook" took the place of the amphibious assault, the news media cried foul. This scenario is an example of a classic military deception campaign, but could it be called a lie? Was it intentional use of the media to mislead the enemy? Imagine PA telling reporters the Coalition planned to attack

with an amphibious assault starting in one month, and all the reporters printed the story. This would have been an overt lie, assuming the Coalition did not intend to attack the beach when the statement was released. What if the commanders had fully intended to attack the beach when the statement was released, but then changed their minds? Should they have called the media and updated them with the new attack plans? Would it have been believable to Saddam? Generally, it is a bad idea to release statements which describe the exact intent of military forces before they engage the enemy. First, it is bad OPSEC. Second, as a Military Deception campaign it is not believable. MILDEC is most effective when it involves letting the enemy see selected truths that will cause him to reach his own incorrect conclusions.



Are PA and IO really on opposite sides of the same road? (Defense Link)

General Schwarzkopf maintains that the press was not intentionally manipulated, and amphibious operations remained a viable alternative until the last day. One could even suggest the press "blew" the invasion by writing detailed stories, so that military commanders were forced to go with an alternate plan. Certainly military leaders usually leave themselves more than one option, and none would argue that it is incumbent upon them to share those options with the media, the American public, or the enemy. The bottom line is that overt lies are dangerous and minimally effective, and PA does play a role in information operations.

Influential sources are on the record advocating strict separation between IO

and PA. The *New York Times* warns of blurring the line between the two lest we return to the Vietnam era, when the American public and the world were skeptical of anything DOD had to say. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a warning about the risks of mixing the two functions, and the Public Relations Society of America has advocated a "strict firewall separation between IO and PA."²⁰ No matter what we name it, the wall between these two information functions will be a pretend one. Both fields have—and will continue—to serve the same purpose: to put out the military's message. We may continue to pretend they are separate by doing what we have been doing. Public Affairs works in one room covering stories they are given by the commander, stories of their own interest

approved by the commander, or responding to outside media with command-approved answers. In the next room, IO planners go through their targeting cycle, since they are using the information spectrum as a weapon system. In any conflict, they are going to try to convince the enemy and our allies that we are right, the enemy is wrong, and the conflict is just. They will follow the commander's objectives and aim at defined centers of gravity. Like the PA efforts, the IO campaign will also received the commander's approval. The commander must now deconflict two plans, put together separately, to ensure they mesh appropriately. This gives Public Affairs personnel a feeling of plausible deniability, but tends to keep them out of the loop for parts of the campaign plan. The lack of unity of effort is an expensive price to pay for the illusion of separation.

Major Tadd Sholtis outlines several myths which have further hampered military information efforts. Among the most important are: "Credibility is Absolute," and "Advocacy is Politics."²¹ The credibility argument states any perception of a link between IO and PA is enough to destroy all credibility for military Public Affairs. However,

Major Sholtis points out credibility is a moving target. An infantryman talking to Fox News has different credibility than a senior Pentagon official talking to Al Jazeera. Further, no one expects military PA to be entirely objective in news releases to the general media. It stands to reason that Public Affair personnel will be military advocates. Of course, PA also covers negative stories, and it is absolutely essential they do so first, in order to maintain the information initiative. The independent media and the public expect PA to be truthful—and they are. However, like all other uniformed military members, PA professionals are driven by a single goal of accomplishing the missions given to them by civilian leadership.

Conclusions

The US finds itself in a new role following 9/11. In large part, Americans have historically favored staying out of the affairs of others unless conditions dictated otherwise. In World War I, the sinking of the Lusitania broke the back of isolationists; Pearl Harbor began the US WWII campaign; and a communist threat prompted involvement in Vietnam. On 10 Sep 2001, the story was no different. Few viewed instability around the world as a direct threat, yet one fateful day again awoke a sleeping giant. Instability anywhere can easily become a threat to the homeland. A more active US role involves all instruments of national power, including an increased US military role in foreign affairs. As evident in the current war in Iraq, the military role will not be the decisive and swift combat operation followed by a quick exit that military commanders favor. Instead, it will be protracted war fought over many decades to convince the rest of the world that democracy and the rule of law are the only legitimate ways to maintain a stable country. The war will not be won by the high tech platforms and weapons systems that the United States prefers to use. Instead, as Special Operations Forces have

known for some time, it will be won by human-to-human interactions which change the minds of people. There are those who say the US military should not act at the world's policeman, and yet we will be thrust into that role as far flung problems become the immediate US national security concerns. We will be forced to not only remove the enemy's ability to fight, but remove his will and desire to fight. The most effective way to do that will be to offer an alternative method to air grievances, and a functional democracy is the way to do that. The war of ideas is the war of the future, and Information Operations are our battlefield.

Notes

¹ AFDD 1-1

² *Information Operations Roadmap*, DOD, 30 Oct 2003.

³ Miklaszewski, Jim, "Rumsfeld: US lags on information battle," MSNBC News, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11408619>

⁴ Ecklund, Marshall V., "Strategic Communications: How to Make it Work?" *IO Sphere* (Fall 2005), 5-10.

⁵ USIA Factsheet, <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/usiahome/factshe.htm>.

⁶ *The United States Information Agency, A Commemoration*, <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/abtusia/commins.pdf>

⁷ Ward, Brad W. *Strategic Influence Operations-The Information Connection*, US Army War College, 2003, 1-33.

⁸ *Ibid*, 18.

⁹ Ecklund, 8.

¹⁰ Dao, James and Schmitt, Eric. "Pentagon Readies Efforts to Sway Sentiment Abroad", *The New York Times*, February 19, 2002, www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0219-01.htm

¹¹ Defense Department News Briefing, February 26, 2002, www.fas.org/sgp/news/2002/02/DOD022602.html

¹² Ward, 16.

¹³ Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy, Apr 2005, <http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d05323high.pdf>

¹⁴ *Smith Mundt Act*, USC Center on Public Diplomacy, http://wiki.uscpublicdiplomacy.com/mediawiki/index.php/Smith_Mundt_Act

¹⁵ *Hitler*, Historical Atlas of the Twentieth Century, <http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat1.htm>

¹⁶ Welch, David, *The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda* (London: Routledge, 1993).

¹⁷ For more on this see Thomas Friedman's *The World is Flat*.

¹⁸ Is the Domestic Dissemination Media Ban Obsolete? <http://www.annenberg.northwestern.edu/pubs/usfa/usfa4.htm>

¹⁹ Crumm, Robert K. *Information Warfare: An Air Force Policy for the role of Public Affairs*. Air University Press. June 1996, 11.

²⁰ Sholtis, Tadd. Public Affairs and Information Operations: A Strategy for Success. *Air and Space Power Journal*, Fall 2005.

²¹ Sholtis. 